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THE NEW ICE AGE: ADDRESSING THE 
DEFICIENCIES IN ARKANSAS’S POSTHUMOUSLY 
CONCEIVED CHILDREN STATUTE
Patrick Grecu 
INTRODUCTION 
The ability to conceive a child using the preserved genetic 
material, or gametes, of a deceased person presents a number of 
legal issues for inheritance, estate planning, Social Security, and 
parental rights.1  New medical advancements in assisted 
reproductive technology (ART) enable individuals to conceive 
children after their death, complicating the conventional methods 
of determining heirship of the decedent under state intestacy 
laws.2  The purpose of intestacy law is to determine the succession 
of a decedent that dies without a will, or intestate, with the goal 
of carrying out the donative intent of the decedent.3  Intestacy law 
has failed to keep pace with these technological advancements, 
which has left the legal status of posthumously conceived 
children (PCC) uncertain in many states.4 
The increasing use of ART in human reproduction presents 
a fundamental issue for the application of intestacy law.  These 
novel methods of reproduction could not be contemplated by 
lawmakers in decades past, and as a result, the impact of ART on 
        J.D. Candidate, 2020, University of Arkansas School of Law.  The author thanks 
Professor Steve Clowney for his inspiration to research this topic and his invaluable advice 
in writing this Note, Professor Danielle Weatherby for her guidance in legal research and 
writing, the staff of the Arkansas Law Review for their editing assistance, and his  wife, 
Natalie, for her patience and encouragement. 
1. Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Dead Soldiers and Their Posthumously Conceived 
Children, 31 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 74, 74 (2015). 
2. Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip Off the Old Iceblock: How Cryopreservation Has 
Changed Estate Law, Why Attempts to Address the Issue Have Fallen Short, and How to Fix 
It, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 349-50 (2011). 
3. Jennifer Seidman, Functional Families and Dysfunctional Laws: Committed 
Partners and Intestate Succession, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 211, 211 (2004). 
4. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 350. 
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inheritance law is unavoidable.5  The failure of many states’ 
intestacy laws to recognize PCC as rightful heirs eliminates the 
child’s ability to inherit through intestacy or receive a class gift 
through a will or trust.6  This problem has been the topic of legal 
scholarship for over half a century, but the American legal system 
has yet to reach a comprehensive and uniform solution.7 
In addition, the significance of state intestacy law governing 
PCC is often not realized until the family, on behalf of the child, 
seeks to obtain benefits for the child or is denied benefits because 
of the child’s legal status.8  For example, a child’s ability to 
receive Social Security survivor’s benefits can depend upon the 
child’s inheritance rights under state intestacy law.9  Similarly, 
life insurance policies and retirement plans that lack a designated 
beneficiary look to intestacy statutes to determine who receives 
the plan proceeds.10  Considering that approximately fifty-eight 
percent of Americans do not have a will, state intestacy law is 
particularly important for PCC’s inheritance rights.11 
5. Melissa B. Vegter, The “ART” of Inheritance: A Proposal for Legislation Requiring 
Proof of Parental Intent Before Posthumously Conceived Children Can Inherit from a 
Deceased Parent’s Estate, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 272 (2003). 
6. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 401.
7. Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father’s Last Will, 46 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 91, 92 (2004).
8. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 359.
9. Id.  Consider this unfortunate and familiar story.  Paula and John, a married couple, 
learn that John has been diagnosed with cancer.  Because chemotherapy treatments could 
likely cause sterility, the couple decided to have a sample of John’s sperm preserved in case 
they wanted to have children in the future.  During this process, John provided legal consent 
for his wife to use his preserved gametes to conceive a child.  Eventually, John succumbed 
to cancer despite his chemotherapy treatments.  Nine months after John’s death, Paula 
conceived a son with John’s frozen sperm using ART.  Three months after her son was born, 
Paula applied to the Social Security Administration for survivor’s benefits for her child, only 
to be denied.  Because state intestacy law did not address posthumously conceived children, 
her son could not receive these benefits despite John’s lifelong contributions into Social 
Security.  This real-life account was taken from the Arkansas H.B 1904 Presentation to the 
House Committee on Aging, Children and Youth, Legislative & Military Affairs on March 
18, 2015.  See To Permit a Child Conceived Through Assisted Reproduction After the Death 
of a Parent to Inherit Real or Personal Property of the Parent that Died Intestate: 
Presentation on HB 1904 Before the House Committee on Aging, Children and Youth, 
Legislative & Military Affairs, 2015 Leg., 90th Gen. Assemb. (Ark. 2015), 
[https://perma.cc/66UD-65WW] [hereinafter Presentation on HB 1904]. 
10. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 359.
11. Nick DiUlio, More Than Half of U.S. Adults Don’t Have a Will, New Survey 
Reveals, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2017), [https://perma.cc/Q7DL-FP7S]. 
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Arkansas is among the minority that specifically addresses 
the inheritance rights of PCC.12  The Arkansas statute, section 28-
9-221, allows PCC to inherit if consent to the posthumous 
conception is given by the decedent and the child is conceived 
within twelve months following the parent’s death and born 
within nineteen months after the death of the parent.13  This 
consent must be in a writing that is “witnessed by a licensed 
physician or a person acting under the supervision of a licensed 
physician.”14 
Although the current statute is laudable in that it confers 
rights to PCC15, it presents a number of practical difficulties. 
First, a parent must ostensibly seek out a medical professional in 
order to provide consent to posthumously conceive.16  Second, the 
statute’s time limitation contains conflicting language that creates 
the potential for the surviving spouse to meet the time limit for 
conceiving the child but not satisfy the time limit for the birth of 
the child.17  Under the current law, a child could be conceived 
within twelve months after the death of a spouse and yet still fall 
outside the time limit of nineteen months for the birth of the child 
in a typical nine-month pregnancy.18  Third, the statute lacks a 
requirement to provide notice to the deceased’s estate that the 
surviving parent plans to use the decedent’s gametes for 
posthumous reproduction.19  Lastly, the statute is unclear whether 
it applies only to married parents.20  Accordingly, the statute 
should be amended to relax and simplify the consent requirement, 
increase the time limitation for conception to three years, add a 
notice requirement, and apply equally regardless of the parents’ 
marital status or sex of the surviving parent. 
This Note addresses the Arkansas statute that regulates the 
inheritance rights of PCC in Arkansas.  Part I explains the issues 
posed by posthumous conception and the technologies that make 
12. See Cassandra M. Ramey, Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived 
Children: A Plan for Nevada, 17 NEV. L.J. 773, 782 (2017). 
13. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221 (2015).
14. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
15. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
16. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
17. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
18. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
19. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
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posthumous conception possible.  Part II discusses the current 
legal approaches to granting inheritance rights to PCC, the policy 
issues that must be considered, and approaches offered by model 
laws, state statutes, and notable judicial decisions.  Part III 
examines the current Arkansas statute, section 28-9-221, which 
governs PCC’s intestate rights and proposes new statutory 
language to address its shortcomings. 
I. INHERITANCE AND THE PREDICAMENT OF
POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION 
The process for determining a person’s heirs has remained 
largely the same until the advent of medical technology that 
makes it possible for individuals to conceive after their death.21  
This technology has created uncertainty concerning how a child 
can receive property through a testamentary instrument, intestate 
succession, and through non-probate methods such as a trust or 
life insurance policy.22 
When a parent dies without a valid will, the rules of intestate 
succession determine the inheritance rights of the deceased’s 
children.23  Traditional parentage and inheritance laws do not 
contemplate the possibility of posthumous conception, generally 
limiting inheritance rights to children born during marriage or 
within 300 days after the death of the father.24 
Importantly, whether a posthumously conceived child has 
inheritance rights depends upon the state of residency, and 
approximately half of the states have not addressed whether PCC 
have an interest in a deceased parent’s estate.25  Because of this, 
PCC are often denied inheritance rights despite having a genetic 
connection to the deceased parent.26  This uncertain area of the 
law is likely to become more complex as new technologies allow 
for novel methods of human reproduction.27 
21. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 347.
22. Id.; Vegter, supra note 5, at 272.
23. Id. 
24. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 108 
(Rachel E. Berkhow et al. eds., 10th ed. 2017). 
25. David Shayne, Posthumously Conceived Child as Heir Depends on Where, 42 EST. 
PLAN. 28, 28 (2015). 
26. Id. 
27. See Sonia Azad, Same-Sex Couple Carries Same ‘Miracle’ Baby in What May Be 
Fertility World First, USA TODAY (Oct. 29, 2018), [https://perma.cc/28YW-7ZEK]. 
2019 THE NEW ICE AGE 635 
A. The Complications of Posthumous Conception
A posthumous child “is conceived before, but born after, his 
father’s death.”28  Under the common law tradition, children born 
out of wedlock, or after the death of the father, were considered 
the child of no one and could not inherit from either parent.29  As 
social norms have evolved with societal changes, all states now 
recognize a posthumous child’s right to inherit and grant 
posthumous children the same legal status of a child born during 
the lifetime of the decedent.30  Although all provide that the child 
can inherit from the mother, states vary how they permit 
inheritance from the father.31 
However, a posthumously conceived child, one not just born 
but conceived after a parent’s death, often faces difficulties not 
encountered by a traditionally conceived child.32  PCC are often 
born into a legal vacuum.33  A posthumously conceived child’s 
uncertain status is a result of conventional laws that were enacted 
long before posthumous conception was a reality.34  Presently, 
approximately half of the states have considered the issue,35 while 
28. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 24, at 107.
29. Julie E. Goodwin, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A Proposal to Address 
Equal Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children , 4 CONN. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 234, 241 (2005). 
30. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210 (1969).  The Uniform Parentage Act establishes a 
rebuttable presumption that a child born to a woman with 300 days after the death of her 
husband is the child of that husband.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1)(B) (2017).  The 
presumptions of parentage are likely required to apply equally to men and women now that 
same-sex couples can marry in all states.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt. (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2017). 
31. Allison Stewart Ellis, Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children in 
Texas, 43 ST. MARY’S L.J. 413, 419 (2012); SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 24, at 109 
(noting that most states allow paternity to be established through “evidence of the subsequent 
marriage of the parents, acknowledgment by the father, an adjudication during the life of the 
father, or clear and convincing proof after his death”).  With the widespread availab ility of 
reliable DNA paternity tests, the modern trend is moving towards allowing posthumous 
proof of paternity by DNA evidence.  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 24, at 109. 
32. Ellis, supra note 31, at 450-51. 
33. Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social 
Security Survivor’s Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
251, 264 (1999). 
34. Brianne M. Star, A Matter of Life and Death: Posthumous Conception, 64 LA. L.
REV. 613, 615 (2004). 
35. Shayne, supra note 25, at 28.
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the remaining state legislatures and the District of Columbia have 
yet to enact statutes that address the legal status of PCC.36 
State intestacy laws are particularly consequential for Social 
Security benefits.  The Social Security Administration (SSA) 
provides benefits to a child of an individual that qualifies for 
Social Security survivor’s benefits.37  The SSA requires that the 
child be under eighteen years of age and a dependent at the time 
of the parent’s death.38  However, a child that can inherit under 
state intestacy law is presumed to be a dependent child that is 
eligible to receive survivor’s benefits.39  These survivor’s benefits 
can be valuable to a family that loses a parent.  A child receiving 
these benefits can get up to seventy-five percent of the deceased 
parent’s benefit, or up to fifty percent if other family members 
also receive benefits.40  In 2017, the average benefit provided to 
children of deceased workers was $856.00 per month.41  This can 
provide valuable assistance to families that lose a wage earner. 
B. An Overview of Assisted Reproductive Technology
Recent advances in medical science now enable a person 
suffering from infertility to conceive a child when he or she would 
otherwise be unable.42  “Assisted reproduction is generally 
defined as any technique,” other than sexual intercourse, “used to 
conceive a child.”43  As the stigma surrounding assisted 
reproduction fades, these medical technologies are becoming 
more popular.  To illustrate, there were 72,913 babies born in the 
United States in 2015 using ART, an increase from 54,656 babies 
36. Id. at 32.  Two of these states, Massachusetts and New Jersey, have relied upon 
case law to grant inheritance rights to posthumously conceived children. 
37. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2015); see also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 497-98 
(1976). 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1).
39. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.355 (1998) (“To decide whether you have inheritance rights 
as the natural child of the insured, we use the law on inheritance rights that the State courts 
would use to decide whether you could inherit a child’s share of the insured’s personal 
property if the insured were to die without leaving a will.”); 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2004).  
40. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., BENEFITS FOR CHILDREN 2 (2018), [https://perma.cc/RH6Y-
XLDW]. 
41. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANN. STAT. SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOC. SEC. BULL., 2018, 
tbl.6.D5 (2019), [https://perma.cc/CXP9-QQBB]. 
42. See Carpenter, supra note 2, at 355.
43. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 352.
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born in 2006.44  The following section summarizes the primary 
methods of ART and why some parents might use assisted 
reproduction to posthumously conceive a child. 
1. Assisted Reproductive Technology Methods
ART includes medical procedures that intend to achieve 
pregnancy through methods other than coitus and are primarily 
used as fertility treatments for people that have difficulty 
conceiving a child.45  There are two categories of ART 
procedures:  internal fertilization and external fertilization.46 
Internal fertilization methods place the sperm and egg, or 
gametes, within the woman’s uterus who is to become pregnant.47  
These procedures include Artificial Insemination (AI) and 
Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT).48  AI “occurs when sperm 
is placed through artificial means into a woman’s uterus to 
facilitate fertilization.”49  In a GIFT procedure, a woman’s eggs 
are retrieved from her ovaries, mixed with sperm, and 
subsequently placed in the woman to be naturally fertilized.50 
In contrast, external fertilization occurs when the gametes 
are extracted and combined to achieve fertilization of the egg 
outside of the mother’s body.51  External fertilization procedures 
combine the male and female gametes in a laboratory procedure 
and then insert the fertilized egg, or embryo, into the woman’s 
44. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2015 ASSISTED REPROD. TECH.:
NAT’L SUMMARY REP. 3, 50 (2017), [https://perma.cc/6TS4-3DJE]. 
45. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), 
[https://perma.cc/E8FU-XNDX] (last visited Sept. 9, 2019). 
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
14.8 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
14.8 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
14.8 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
49. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 352-53. 
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
14.8 cmt. b; Jeffery Walters, Thawing the Inheritance Rights of Maybe Babies: An Answer 
to Indiana’s Statutory Silence on Posthumously Conceived Children , 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 
1229, 1236 (2014). 
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
14.8 cmt. b. 
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uterus.52  This category of ART is often referred to as In Vitro 
Fertilization (IVF) and is by far the most common and effective 
form of ART.53  The IVF procedure can use the mother’s eggs or 
a donor’s eggs to produce a pregnancy.54 
The driving force behind these technologies is 
cryopreservation.55  The process of cryopreservation uses very 
low temperatures to preserve reproductive materials for later 
use.56  This procedure maintains the viability of the preserved 
gametes for decades and creates the ability to conceive children 
long after a person’s death.57  The ability to maintain the viability 
of genetic material for an extended period of time has 
dramatically altered the possibilities for ART.58 
Lastly, surrogacy provides another method of utilizing ART 
to conceive a child.  This involves an agreement in which a 
woman, impregnated through an IVF procedure, carries a child to 
birth for the intended parent or parents.59 
2. Why Posthumous Conception?
Although the reasons why couples look to ART to achieve 
pregnancy during their lifetime are obvious, why an individual 
would use their deceased partner’s genetic material to conceive a 
child is less evident.60  However, there are myriad reasons why a 
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
14.8 cmt. b. 
53. See SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 
[https://perma.cc/GRF6-KGKX] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
14.8 cmt. b. 
55. Walters, supra note 50, at 1234-35. 
56. Id. 
57. Susan L. Barrett & Teresa K. Woodruff, Gamete Preservation, NAT’L INST. OF 
HEALTH (May 3, 2011), [https://perma.cc/ZE7F-WLU2].  A famous example of the viability 
of decades-old preserved genetic material is the case of a couple that had a daughter using 
the father’s sperm that was preserved for twenty-two years.  Kate Snow et al., Frozen Sperm 
Still Viable Decades Later, ABC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2009), [https://perma.cc/5X5Y-UWWH].  
In 2017, a child was born using an embryo preserved for twenty-four years.  Sarah Zhang, A 
Woman Gave Birth from an Embryo Frozen for 24 Years, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 21, 2017), 
[https://perma.cc/V357-R6GN]. 
58. See, e.g., Zhang, supra note 57. 
59. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 354.  The legal ramifications of surrogacy on the 
inheritance rights of a posthumously conceived child vary greatly by state and are beyond 
the scope of this Note. 
60. Id. at 358.
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partner would want to conceive his or her deceased partner’s 
child.61  A person may want to use a loved one’s gametes as a 
tribute to their deceased partner.62  Others may use the deceased’s 
preserved genetic material for religious reasons to avoid using 
donated sperm to conceive.63  Also, a person may want to have a 
child that is a direct descendent of both parents to know the 
genetic origins of the child.64 
Furthermore, financial incentives may lead a surviving 
partner to use a deceased partner’s gametes.65  The cost of 
conceiving a child using ART is substantial, and the expense is 
dramatically reduced if the surviving partner uses the preserved 
genetic material of the deceased partner.66  In addition, this 
method may allow the child to inherit from the decedent or other 
family members, to be eligible to become a beneficiary of a trust, 
or to qualify for Social Security survivor’s benefits.67 
II. CURRENT LEGAL APPROACHES TO
POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN 
A notable shortcoming of modern probate law is the lack of 
certainty in the inheritance rights of children outside of the 
traditional nuclear family.68  The inheritance rights of an 
individual are determined by the laws of the state in which they 
are domiciled at his or her death.69  These state intestacy statutes 
are the default rules for disposing of probate property of a 
decedent who dies without a will.70  Many state intestacy statutes 
enacted well before the advent of new reproductive technologies 
do not address the inheritance rights of PCC.71 
61. Id.
62. Kristine S. Knaplund, Legal Issues of Maternity and Inheritance for the Biotech 
Child of the 21st Century, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 393, 398 (2008). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 399; Carpenter, supra note 2, at 358.
65. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 359.
66. Knaplund, supra note 62, at 399-400. 
67. Id. at 398, 400-01. 
68. Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 
UTAH L. REV. 93, 94. 
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 260 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
70. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 24, at 63.
71. Shayne, supra note 25, at 28.
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Legislatures must consider a number of policy issues when 
drafting legislation affecting PCC.72  Broadly speaking, these key 
interests include the efficient administration of estates, the intent 
of the decedent, and the best interests of the child.73  The drafters 
of the uniform laws have attempted to balance these interests in 
creating model codes that provide inheritance rights to PCC.  An 
increasing number of states have addressed the issue, often 
relying on the guidance of the model laws.74  In a small number 
of states, case law still governs the legal status of PCC.75 
A. Policy Issues in Determining the Inheritance Rights of
Posthumously Conceived Children 
As the use of ART becomes more common, state legislatures 
in the United States are charged with determining the best 
approach to address the issues presented by the increased use of 
ART and the possibility of posthumous conception.  States 
promulgate the rules that govern the probate of testamentary 
instruments and the distribution of estates with the purpose to 
carry out the likely intent of the decedent.76  To achieve that end, 
state legislatures must consider key issues:  (1) whether consent 
of the deceased parent is required; (2) if notice of intent to use 
decedent’s gametes for posthumous reproduction is needed; (3) 
what time constraints are appropriate; (4) the parents’ marital 
status and sex of the surviving parent; and (5) the best interests of 
the child.77 
1. Consent
An essential matter that states must consider is whether a 
deceased parent must give consent for the posthumous use of his 
or her preserved genetic material to conceive a child.78  Requiring 
72. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 417.
73. Id. 
74. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19 
(2009). 
75. See infra Part II.D.
76. Vegter, supra note 5, at 299.
77. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 404; Star, supra note 34, at 626-29. 
78. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 418; Browne C. Lewis, Dead Men Reproducing: 
Responding to the Existence of Afterdeath Children, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 403, 427-34 
(2009). 
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the decedent to give consent for posthumous reproduction aligns 
with the goal of intestacy law, which seeks to fulfill the intent of 
the deceased.79  If consent is necessary, it is important to 
determine the methods of providing consent under the statute, 
while still carrying out the intent of the deceased.80  To date, the 
legislatures that have granted inheritance rights to PCC have 
overwhelmingly required the consent of the decedent.81  Yet 
states vary as to how the consent requirement may be met and 
what degree of specificity is required.82 
In addition, legislatures must also consider the impact of a 
divorce upon the prior consent given by the former spouse. 
Allowing an ex-spouse to use a former partner’s preserved 
genetic material to conceive a child after his or her death would 
likely undermine the wishes of the divorced decedent.83  To avoid 
such a result, some states have provided for automatic revocation 
of a spouse’s consent to posthumous conception in the event of 
divorce.84 
2. Notice
Second, legislatures must determine whether the “surviving 
spouse or partner must give notice” within a specified time to the 
administrator or executor of the decedent’s estate of his or her 
79. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 370; Vegter, supra note 5, at 299.
80. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 420.
81. Id. at 418.  Although states addressing this issue have required consent for 
posthumously children to fall within the ambit of their statutes, some scholars argue for a 
less restrictive approach.  See Shelly Simana, Creating Life After Death: Should Posthumous 
Reproduction Be Legally Permissible Without the Deceased’s Prior Consent? , 5 J. L. & 
BIOSCIENCES 329, 354 (2018) (arguing that “posthumous reproduction should be legally 
permitted, even in the absence of the deceased’s prior consent, and [] the default position 
should be to presume that the deceased consented to posthumous reproduction, unless he or 
she previously objected to it or there are strong indications ([e.g.] religious beliefs or values) 
that the person would not have agreed”). 
82. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19 (2009) 
(requiring consent “in a record”); CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (2005) (requiring consent in 
writing that specifies decedent’s genetic material shall be used for posthumous conception 
that must be signed and dated and designate a person to control the use of the decedent’s 
gametes); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221 (2015) (requiring the decedent consent in “writing 
that is either notarized or witnessed by a licensed physician or a person acting under the 
supervision of a licensed physician”). 
83. Ellis, supra note 31, at 439.
84. Id. 
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intent to use the decedent’s gametes to conceive a child.85  A 
notice requirement is advantageous in that it serves to protect the 
fiduciary from liability if future claims are made on the estate and 
to protect the beneficiaries that receive property from liability of 
future claims to the devised assets.86 
3. Time Constraints
Third, state legislatures must consider whether a child 
conceived after the death of a parent must be in utero or born 
within a definite time period after the decedent’s death.87  
Providing a time limitation allows for the efficient administration 
of a decedent’s estate.88  Additionally, a time limitation provides 
finality to estate administration and protects “fiduciaries who may 
distribute assets while unaware that the decedent left preserved 
genetic material.”89  States commonly provide time constraints 
for when the child must be born,90 in gestation,91 or both.92  Some 
states provide a time limitation of three years,93 while other states 
are more restrictive.94 
Although it is important to provide finality in estate 
administration, statutes that offer a generous time limitation allow 
the surviving spouse time to reflect on the choice to pursue a 
pregnancy with ART while also supplying certainty in the 
administration of the decedent’s estate.95  Furthermore, a time 
constraint of two or three years allows the surviving parent to 
achieve a successful pregnancy with ART if the initial attempt is 
unsuccessful.96 
85. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 423.
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 424-26. 
88. Id. at 425. 
89. Id. 
90. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (2003).
91. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(c) (2005).
92. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120(11) (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-
19(11) (2009). 
93. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(11). 
94. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221(a) (2015).
95. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 425.
96. Id. 
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4. Marital Status and Sex of the Parent
Fourth, states must consider whether to make marriage a 
prerequisite for a posthumously conceived child to inherit,97 and 
whether the statute applies equally to men and women.98  Many 
states have restricted inheritance rights of PCC to those born to 
parents married at the time of death.99  Likewise, states must 
decide how intestacy law will apply in situations where a woman 
dies before a spouse and intends her preserved gametes to be used 
for posthumous conception.100  These are major issues to 
examine, as legislatures that restrict inheritance rights of PCC to 
children born to married parents may violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.101  State restrictions that restrict the ability of PCC to 
inherit through intestacy law must be substantially related to 
important state interests.102  Allowing differential treatment of 
similarly situated children based on the parents’ marital status to 
preclude children born to unmarried couples from inheriting is 
unlikely to survive constitutional challenges.103  In addition, 
restricting a posthumously conceived child’s inheritance rights 
based on the sex of the parent could also be similarly 
unconstitutional.104 
97. Star, supra note 34, at 639. 
98. Knaplund, supra note 62, at 412.
99. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221; IOWA CODE § 633.220A (2011); LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:391.1 (2003). 
100. Knaplund, supra note 62, at 412. 
101. See Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 557 (2012); Carpenter, supra 
note 2, at 427; Goodwin, supra note 29, at 271 (noting that PCC are “non-marital children” 
because the death of a spouse ends a marriage and intestacy laws that “categorically deny” 
all PCC from inheriting would violate the Equal Protection Clause under intermediate 
scrutiny). 
102. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (opining that classifications 
based on legitimacy are subject to intermediate scrutiny); Carpenter, supra note 2, at 427. 
103. See Astrue, 566 U.S. at 556; Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; Carpenter, supra note 2, at 
427. 
104. Linda Kelly Hill, Equal Protection Misapplied: The Politics of Gender and 
Legitimacy and the Denial of Inheritance, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 129, 140 (2006). 
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5. Best Interests of the Child
Lastly, state legislatures must consider the child’s best 
interests.  A child has the right to parental financial support.105  
Allowing PCC to receive government benefits in the same 
manner as traditionally conceived children provides uniformity 
and fairness in the distribution of public resources.106  The 
purpose of the Social Security provision for survivor’s benefits is 
to give support to dependents that have lost a wage earner.107  In 
this light, the same opportunity to receive these entitlements 
should apply equally to traditionally conceived children and those 
conceived using ART.  Placing an outright ban on a posthumously 
conceived child’s ability to inherit or receive government benefits 
would be against the child’s best interests and counter to public 
policy to provide for children “as completely as possible.”108  A 
child born through untraditional methods should not be punished 
for the reproductive choices of his or her parents. 
B. The Proposed Laws Addressing Posthumously Conceived
Children 
A number of uniform model codes address the inheritance 
rights of PCC,109 yet they take widely different approaches. 
Specifically, the model laws vary significantly in how consent of 
the deceased parent may be established and the duration of the 
time restrictions.110  Despite the guidance provided by these 
codes, presently only half of the state legislatures have 
promulgated laws addressing the rights of PCC.111  The remaining 
105. See Vegter, supra note 5, at 292-93; Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 
257, 265 (Mass. 2002). 
106. Vegter, supra note 5, at 293.
107. Susan E. Satava, Discrimination Against the Unacknowledged Illegitimate Child 
and the Wrongful Death Statute, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 933, 984 (1996).  Providing Social 
Security survivor’s benefits for posthumously conceived children is especially 
consequential.  Child poverty rates vary substantially with respect to marital status.  See U.S. 
DEP’T OF COM., INCOME & POVERTY IN THE U.S.: 2017 13 (2018), [https://perma.cc/R4S5-
DLJT].  The child poverty rate in a married-couple family is 8.4%, compared with a rate of 
40.8% for children living only with their mother and 19.1% for children living only with 
their father.  Id. 
108. Vegter, supra note 5, at 293.
109. Goodwin, supra note 29, at 255.
110. See id. at 255-59.
111. Shayne, supra note 25, at 28.
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states have left it to the courts to interpret their intestacy laws to 
determine the legal status of PCC.112   
1. The Uniform Probate Code
The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) provides that a 
posthumously conceived child may inherit through intestate 
succession and class gifts, subject to certain conditions.113  If two 
conditions are met, the UPC considers a child conceived after a 
parent’s death a child of the deceased parent.114  First, the 
deceased parent must have “signed a record that, considering all 
the facts and circumstances, evidences the individual’s 
consent”115 or “intended to function as a parent of the child.”116  
This intent can be established by clear and convincing 
evidence.117  Second, the posthumously conceived child must be 
“in utero not later than 36 months after the individual’s death”118 
or “born not later than 45 months after the individual’s death.”119 
2. The Uniform Parentage Act
The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) addresses the parental 
status of a deceased parent.120  If two requirements are met, the 
decedent may be deemed the parent of the posthumously 
conceived child.121  First, the deceased individual must have 
“consented in a record” to be the parent of the child “if assisted 
reproduction were to occur after the” decedent’s death122 or the 
deceased’s intent to be a parent of a posthumously conceived 
child is established by clear and convincing evidence.123  Second, 
the child must be “in utero not later than 36 months after the 
112. Goodwin, supra note 29, at 255.
113. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 372.
114. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N amended 2010).
115. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(1).
116. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(2)(B).
117. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(2)(C).
118. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k)(1).
119. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k)(2).
120. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
121. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708(b).
122. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708(b)(1)(A).
123. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708(b)(1)(B).
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individual’s death”124 or “born not later than 45 months after the 
individual’s death.”125 
3. Restatement (Third) of Property
The Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other 
Donative Transfers suggests a much broader approach to 
allowing PCC to inherit by intestate succession.126  The drafters 
take the position that for a child of ART to inherit from a deceased 
parent the child “must be born within a reasonable time after the 
decedent’s death in circumstances indicating that the decedent 
would have approved of the child’s right to inherit.”127  It also 
indicates that a “clear case” would be one in which a child was 
born “by artificial insemination of the decedent’s widow with his 
frozen sperm.”128 
4. Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technologies
In 2008, the American Bar Association drafted the Model 
Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology.129  This 
model legislation adopts the view that a child conceived after a 
parent’s death is recognized as a child of the deceased parent if 
the individual consented “in a record that if assisted reproduction 
were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a 
parent of the child.”130  Additionally, the Act indicates that the 
consent must be “dated and signed by the [medical] provider and 
124. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708(b)(2)(A).
125. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708(b)(2)(B).
126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 2.5 cmt. l (AM. LAW INST. 1999). 
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
2.5 cmt. l.  For class gift purposes, the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other 
Donative Transfers mirrors the UPC’s approach to posthumously conceived children, 
requiring consent in “writing or other record . . . exhibiting intent, in light of all the facts and 
circumstances, to be treated as the child’s other parent.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 14.8(2)(A).  Absent a signed writing or record, 
the child may inherit if the deceased parent either intended to function as a parent and was 
prevented by death or intended to be treated as a parent of a posthumously conceived child, 
“but only if that intent is established by clear and convincing evidence.”  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 14.8(2)(B)(ii)-(iii). 
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
2.5 cmt. l. 
129. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008). 
130. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 607. 
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the participant,”131 specify the parental rights of all 
participants,132 and define the length of time that consent will 
remain valid.133 
C. Statutory Approaches
The following section outlines the approaches taken by state 
legislatures in addressing the inheritance rights of PCC.  A survey 
of state intestacy laws reveals an unfortunate lack of uniformity. 
Of the states that have taken up the issue, several states have 
statutes that specifically include PCC when certain conditions are 
met,134 while other states have explicitly excluded them from 
inheriting from a deceased parent.135 
1. States Including Posthumously Conceived Children
A minority of states have explicitly granted inheritance 
rights to PCC.136  These states have attempted to “foster 
individual procreative liberty” by relying on an “‘intent-based’ 
framework in addressing the legal status and rights of children 
and progenitors involved in assisted reproduction.”137  In general, 
the majority of states that recognize the parental relationships 
between a deceased parent and a child conceived after the parent’s 
death have placed limitations on the child’s ability to inherit.  In 
131. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 202(1)(b).
132. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 202(1)(c).
133. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 202(1)(e).
134. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106(8) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(11) 
(2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077(4) (2016). 
135. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-120(10) (2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 474.050 (1955); OHIO. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (West 2019). 
136. States that have enacted statutes that extend inheritance rights to children 
conceived after the death of a parent include: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, New York, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and 
Wyoming.  See Kathryn McColl Sargent, Recent Connecticut Legislation on Inheritance 
Rights of Children Conceived Posthumously Via In-Vitro Fertilization, 89 CONN. B.J. 149, 
156-57 (2015); CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106; CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 45a-785 (2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. §
742.17 (1993); IOWA CODE § 633.267 (2011); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2003); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3 (McKinney 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19; TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707 (West 2019); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.635 (2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-907 (West 2019).
137. Banks, supra note 33, at 292. 
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addition, many state laws only apply to situations in which the 
parents of the child were married. 
Some states, such as Colorado and North Dakota, have relied 
on the UPC for guidance.138  Colorado grants inheritance rights to 
children conceived using ART after the death of a spouse if the 
decedent “consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were 
to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the 
child” but omits the time limitation.139  Similarly, North Dakota 
also recognizes a parent-child relationship between a child 
conceived after a parent’s death using assisted reproduction but 
has adopted the more specific provisions of the UPC.140  The 
statute follows the UPC’s consent requirement of a signed record 
or clear and convincing evidence of the deceased’s intent along 
with the time constraints that require the child to be in utero 
within thirty-six months and born within forty-five months of the 
parent’s death.141 
Other state statutes also include a notice requirement.142  For 
example, California’s statute grants inheritance rights to a child 
conceived after the death of a parent if the child proves by clear 
and convincing evidence that specific conditions are satisfied.143  
Under California law, the decedent must have specified in writing 
that his or her gametes were to be used for posthumous 
conception.144  This writing must be signed and dated, designate 
a person to control the use of the gametes, and can only be 
revoked or amended in writing.145  In addition, notice that the 
deceased’s genetic material is available for posthumous use must 
be given to the executor or administrator of the decedent’s estate 
within four months of the decedent’s death.146  Lastly, the child 
must be “in utero within two years . . . of the decedent’s death.”147 
138. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106; N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19. 
139. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106(8). 
140. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(11) (West 2020).
141. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19. 
142. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (2005); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW 
§ 4-1.3 (McKinney 2019).
143. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5. 
144. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(a).
145. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(a)(1)-(3). 
146. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(b).
147. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(c).
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2. States Excluding Posthumously Conceived Children
In contrast, other states have chosen to specifically deny 
inheritance rights to PCC.148  For instance, Georgia, Idaho, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, South Carolina, and South Dakota 
are among the states that have excluded these children from 
inheriting under their intestacy laws.149  These states rely on the 
historical presumption that children not alive or in gestation at the 
time of the parent’s death cannot inherit from the decedent.150  
Not only are these children excluded from intestate inheritance, 
but they are also unable to receive Social Security survivor’s 
benefits from the deceased parent.151 
In a significant number of states, the legal status of PCC has 
yet to be addressed and remains unclear.152  Often, states have 
overlooked how children born using ART do not fall within the 
timeline of a typical conception and birth possible by sexual 
intercourse.153  As a result, courts are forced to determine whether 
a child conceived after a parent’s death falls within the language 
of the state statutes that apply to children conceived before 
death.154 
D. Judicial Decisions
Many courts have been tasked with determining the legal 
status of PCC by interpreting and applying traditional 
posthumous children statutes.  They are faced with ascertaining 
the intent of the legislature and construing the language of the 
statute to apply to nontraditional circumstances.  Two influential 
cases, In re Estate of Kolacy in New Jersey and Woodward v. 
148. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 405
149. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(b)(1) (West 2019); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-108 
(2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2104 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-120 subdiv. 10 (2010); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 474.050 (1955); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (West 2019); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 62-2-108 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-108 (2007).  
150. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 405
151. Id. at 415. 
152. Id. at 403-04. 
153. Ramey, supra note 12, at 778.
154. See In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); 
Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 264 (Mass. 2002); Khabbaz  ex rel. Eng 
v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1183-84 (N.H. 2007); Finley v. Astrue, 372 
Ark. 103, 110, 270 S.W.3d 849, 853 (2008).
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Commissioner of Social Security in Massachusetts, allowed for 
children born after the death of a parent to inherit from the 
decedent.155  The court in In re Estate of Kolacy held that the 
general intent of the statute should prevail over the plain language 
that failed to contemplate new technologies.156  Similarly, the 
court in Woodward established that PCC could inherit from a 
deceased parent if certain circumstances are met.157 
In contrast, in Khabbaz v. Commissioner, Social Security 
Administration, the New Hampshire Supreme Court declined to 
extend inheritance rights to PCC.158  The court contended that to 
interpret the law to include children conceived after a parent’s 
death would require it to “add words to [the] statute” and noted 
that matters of public policy were best left to the legislature.159 
It appears that state intestacy law will continue to play a 
major role in whether a posthumously conceived child qualifies 
for Social Security benefits.  Recently in Astrue v. Capato ex rel. 
B.N.C., the United States Supreme Court unanimously upheld the 
validity of the SSA’s use of state intestacy laws in determining a 
child’s eligibility to receive Social Security survivor’s benefits.160 
III. THE INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF POSTHUMOUSLY
CONCEIVED CHILDREN IN ARKANSAS 
A. The History of Arkansas Case Law
In 2008, the Arkansas Supreme Court considered a question 
of law certified to the Court by the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Arkansas.161  The case came before the 
155. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1263-64; Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272.
156. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1262. 
157. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272.  The court determined that a child could inherit 
from a deceased parent if (1) a genetic relationship with the deceased parent was established; 
(2) the decedent consented before death to posthumous reproduction; and (3) the decedent 
consented to support the child.  Id.  In addition, time limitation could bar a claim for 
inheritance, and notice must be given to all interested parties in any action.  Id. 
158. In re Estate of Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1182.  The court considered, “Is a child 
conceived after her father’s death via artificial insemination eligible to inherit from her father 
as his surviving issue under New Hampshire intestacy law?”  Id. 
159. Id. at 1186.
160. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 555-56 (2012). 
161. Finley v. Astrue, 372 Ark. 103, 104, 270 S.W.3d 849, 850 (2008).  The case was 
delivered to the Arkansas Supreme Court by a certified question from the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.  See Finley v. Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 
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District Court as an appeal by Amy Finley from the final decision 
of the SSA which denied her posthumously conceived child’s 
claim to survivor’s benefits.162  A child’s eligibility to receive 
these benefits depends on whether they are considered an heir 
under the state’s intestacy laws.163 
In Finley v. Astrue, Ms. Finley and her husband pursued 
fertility treatments during the marriage and decided to participate 
in the IVF process.164  Initially, an IVF procedure failed to 
produce a pregnancy from the implanted embryos.165  Mr. Finley 
died intestate the month after the failed procedure.166  Less than 
one year later, Ms. Finley became pregnant using the couple’s 
preserved genetic material.167 
The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the language of 
the existing state statute addressing posthumous heirs as those 
children “conceived before his or her death” means that only such 
heirs could inherit under the law.168  Refusing to define the term 
“conceive,” the Court rejected the argument that the child had 
been conceived prior to the father’s death despite existing as a 
fertilized embryo during the lifetime of the deceased father.169  
The Court declined to construe the statute to include PCC in part 
because the “General Assembly, in enacting . . . [the posthumous 
descendants statute], did not intend for the statute to permit a 
child, created through in vitro fertilization and implanted after the 
father’s death, to inherit under intestate succession.”170  Despite 
refusing to interpret the statute’s language to include PCC, the 
Court noted:  “The determination of public policy lies almost 
exclusively with the legislature. . . . [W]e strongly encourage the 
General Assembly to revisit the intestacy succession statutes to 
1092, 1097-98 (E.D. Ark. 2009).  For a detailed analysis of the Finley decision, see generally 
Buckley W. Bridges, Statutory Misconception: The Arkansas Supreme Court’s Method in 
Finley v. Astrue Sets New Precedent for Uncertainty, 63 ARK. L. REV. 419 (2010). 
162. Finley, 372 Ark. at 105, 270 S.W.3d at 850.
163. 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(b)(1) (1998). 
164. Finley, 372 Ark. at 105, 270 S.W.3d at 850.
165. Id. at 106, 270 S.W.3d at 850.
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 106, 270 S.W.3d at 850-51. 
168. Id. at 110, 270 S.W.3d at 853.
169. Finley, 372 Ark. at 111, 270 S.W.3d at 854.
170. Id. at 110, 270 S.W.3d at 853.
652 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  72:3 
address the issues involved in the instant case and those that have 
not but will likely evolve.”171 
B. The Legislature Takes Action
Six years after the Finley decision, the State Legislature took 
up the challenge posed by the Arkansas Supreme Court.  In 2015, 
the General Assembly enacted section 28-9-221, addressing the 
issue of PCC posed in Finley.172  The statute provides: 
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the
contrary, a child conceived after the death of a decedent who 
specifically authorized the decedent’s surviving spouse, in a 
writing that is either notarized or witnessed by a licensed 
physician or a person acting under the supervision of a licensed 
physician, to use the decedent’s gametes after the decedent’s 
death shall be deemed the child of the decedent with the right to 
inherit from the decedent if the child is conceived within twelve 
(12) months following the death of the decedent and born within
nineteen (19) months following the death of the decedent.
(b) This section is retroactive to December 1, 2009, solely
for the purpose of establishing a posthumous child’s entitlement 
to Social Security benefits under the federal Social Security Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 402(d), deriving from the decedent.173 
This statute is a significant step in recognizing parental 
relationships and extending inheritance rights to children that are 
born using ART after the death of a parent.  However, this 
171. Id. at 112, 270 S.W.3d at 855.  Finley’s child was also denied Worker’s 
Compensation benefits.  See Finley v. Farm Cat, Inc., 103 Ark. App. 292, 296, 288 S.W.3d 
685, 689 (2008). 
172. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221 (2015).  It should be noted that the Finley decision 
itself was not the motivation for enacting the current law.  The current statute was passed 
after Paula Shelton, noted in the Introduction, supra, brought the issue to the attention of 
Representative Warwick Sabin, the bill’s sponsor.  See Presentation on HB 1904, supra note 
9. The efforts of Representative Sabin to ensure that PCC have inheritance rights are 
commendable.  After investigating the legislative history of House Bill 1904, the most 
vexatious shortcomings of the current statute were not present in the original bill presented 
by Representative Sabin but appear to have been the result of amendments made in the
Senate.  See S. Amendment No. 2 to H.B. 1904, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015) 
(revising the time limitation for a parent to posthumously conceive a child from ten months 
after the decedent’s death to twelve months but still retaining the remaining language that 
required the child to be born nineteen months after the decedent’s death).
173. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
2019 THE NEW ICE AGE 653 
positive advancement in granting PCC inheritance rights is not 
without its problems. 
C. The Quandary of Arkansas’s Posthumously Conceived
Children Statute 
The current Arkansas statute addressing the intestate 
inheritance of PCC presents a number of perplexing issues.  First, 
the consent requirement creates practical and legal difficulties by 
seemingly requiring the involvement of medical professionals.174  
Second, the time limitation is restrictive, and the plain language 
of the statute itself is conflicting.175  Third, the statute lacks any 
requirement to give notice to the fiduciary of the decedent’s estate 
of the possibility of posthumous conception.176  Finally, the 
language of the statute appears to apply only to a child that is born 
to parents that were married at the time of the deceased parent’s 
death.177 
1. Consent
The current statute requires that the decedent give consent to 
the posthumous use of his or her genetic material for a 
posthumously conceived child to be considered a legal child of 
the decedent with the right to inherit from the deceased parent.178  
Under the statute, a decedent manifests consent if the person 
“specifically authorized the decedent’s surviving spouse” to use 
his or her gametes “in a writing that is either notarized or 
witnessed by a licensed physician or a person acting under the 
supervision of a licensed physician.”179 
This provision presents two issues.  First, the language of the 
statute itself creates ambiguity regarding the consent requirement. 
The words indicating that the writing must be “either notarized or 
witnessed by a licensed physician” or a person supervised by a 
174. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
175. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
176. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
177. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221(a). 
178. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
179. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
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licensed physician presents unanswered questions.180  Is the 
writing to be notarized or witnessed by a licensed physician or 
supervised medical staff?  Or does this present two different 
options of giving legal consent by:  (1) having the writing 
notarized by a notary; or (2) witnessed by a licensed physician or 
staff member?  Unfortunately, the surrounding words of the 
statute fail to resolve the ambiguity. 
Second, the law requires a person to seek out a medical 
professional to provide legal consent to allow a posthumously 
conceived child to inherit.181  Although this could conceivably 
streamline the process for providing consent through a 
standardized procedure,182 this creates other concerns.  The 
statute ostensibly requires an individual intending to give legal 
consent to posthumously conceive a child to seek out a medical 
professional, instead of a lawyer.183  Although fertility clinics 
require individuals to provide consent to perform assisted 
reproduction procedures,184 deferring to the medical community 
to fulfill statutory requirements in determining a child’s legal 
status seems ill-advised.  This unwieldy requirement places an 
unnecessary burden on a parent that may wish for the surviving 
parent to use his or her genetic material to have a child. 
As an initial matter, the legislature should provide clarity for 
what constitutes consent under the statute.  The most expedient 
approach would be to follow the guidance of the UPA and require 
the decedent to consent in a record185 or allow the surviving 
spouse to prove the decedent’s intent by clear and convincing 
evidence.186  I argue that the consent requirement should be 
simplified by allowing an individual to approve of the 
posthumous use of his or her gametes without formalities that 
may invalidate the decedent’s intent to posthumously conceive. 
In addition, dispensing with the current language of the statute 
would resolve the grammatical ambiguity present in the current 
180. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
181. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
182. Ellis, supra note 31, at 436.
183. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
184. Debbie K. Lerner, New Reproductive Technology and Wisconsin Law: Fertility 
Clinics Making Law, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 206, 214 (1991). 
185. One example would be a fertility treatment facility consent form completed prior 
to undergoing fertility procedures. 
186. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 421.
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version and eliminate the involvement of medical professionals 
in the consent process. 
Lastly, the legislature should address the effect of a divorce 
on the prior consent of a spouse.  To carry out the likely intent of 
the decedent, consent should be automatically revoked upon the 
divorce of a married couple.187  This would eliminate the 
possibility that the surviving ex-spouse could undermine the 
intent of the deceased.  Revoking prior consent of the deceased 
parent would fall in line with other probate law, such as the rule 
of automatically revoking will provisions devising property to a 
spouse in the event of a divorce.188 
2. Time Limitation
Perhaps the most unusual shortcoming is the time limitation 
to conceive and give birth to a posthumous child after a parent’s 
death.  The statute provides that the child must be conceived 
within twelve months after the spouse’s death and born within 
nineteen months after the death of the parent.189  The plain 
language of the statute creates an inconsistency that would allow 
the surviving spouse to fulfill part of the requirement, yet not 
satisfy the time of birth requirement.  It could easily be 
foreseeable that a child could be conceived with the decedent’s 
gametes within twelve months following the death of the 
decedent and yet still be in gestation beyond nineteen months 
after the death given the typical nine-month gestation period. 
Curiously, the statute fails to account for the usual duration of 
pregnancy.190 
In addition, the time limitation itself is restrictive, requiring 
those who are grieving to make a very significant decision quickly 
after losing a loved one.  The current law requires a surviving 
parent to decide to conceive a child within a few months after the 
death of his or her spouse and then successfully achieve a 
pregnancy with the decedent’s gametes using ART within twelve 
187. This is in accord with the Uniform Parentage Act.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
188. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-109(b) (1979) (revoking all provisions in a will in 
favor of the testator’s spouse in the event of divorce or annulment). 
189. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221 (2015).
190. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
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months of the loss.191  This forces the person to make a 
momentous life decision and plan for any complications that may 
occur, such as the possibility of a failed ART procedure, nearly 
immediately after the death of a loved one. 
These issues must be addressed to provide clarity.  First, the 
legislature must resolve the conflicting language in the statute. 
The current language that allows a child to inherit “if the child is 
conceived within twelve (12) months following the death of the 
decedent and born within nineteen (19) months following the 
death of the decedent” creates an unresolvable conflict due to the 
typical nine-month duration of pregnancy.192  It is imperative for 
the law to establish readily identifiable time limitations to provide 
certainty to families pursuing posthumous conception. 
Second, the time limitation should be extended to permit the 
posthumous child to be conceived within three years following 
the decedent’s death, which aligns with the UPC’s approach.193  
A longer time limitation accounts for a period of grieving and the 
practical realities of using ART, which can often require multiple 
attempts to achieve a pregnancy.194 
3. Lack of Notice Requirement
Furthermore, the current statute does not require a person 
intending to use the deceased gametes for posthumous 
reproduction to give notice to the fiduciary of the decedent’s 
estate.  Although this is not essential, providing notice in writing 
allows the fiduciary to protect assets in which the child has an 
interest.195 
To aid in the administration of estates, Arkansas should also 
consider adding a notice element to the statute.  A surviving 
parent of the posthumously conceived child should provide notice 
within six months to a fiduciary or custodian managing the 
decedent’s assets that posthumous conception is a possibility. 
This protects the fiduciary and the future child’s interest in the 
decedent’s property.  However, the failure to meet this procedural 
191. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
192. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221. 
193. See supra Part II.B.1.
194. Vegter, supra note 5, at 270.
195. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 423.
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requirement should not decide the child’s status as an heir of the 
deceased parent.  If the fiduciary is not given notice, the fiduciary 
may distribute assets without liability after the six-month notice 
period.196  The effect would be that the child would not receive 
the property already distributed from the deceased parent’s estate 
if notice is not provided yet would still qualify for Social Security 
survivor’s benefits or other inheritance rights.  This would serve 
to protect the child’s interests while allowing for the timely 
administration of the parent’s estate.197  Furthermore, if notice is 
given to the fiduciary after the notice period, the fiduciary should 
have a duty to retain any remaining assets to which the child may 
have a claim until the end of the three-year time limitation.198 
4. Marriage Requirement
Lastly, the statute may face constitutional challenges under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
limiting inheritance rights based on the martial status of the 
parents.199  In this case, the language of the current statute may 
present an ambiguity with regard to the relationship status of the 
parents of a posthumously conceived child.  The term “decedent” 
is used to refer to the deceased parent, but the word “spouse” is 
used in reference to the “decedent’s surviving spouse.”200 
Although not wholly evident from the words in the statute, 
the discussion of the bill during the presentation to the Arkansas 
House of Representatives Committee on House Aging, Children 
and Youth, Legislative & Military Affairs indicates that the 
statute was intended to apply to parents that are married at the 
time of the death of the decedent.201  To ensure that the statute 
applies equally to both married and unmarried parents, this 
limiting language should be amended to remove the term 
“spouse,” which bars PCC born to unmarried parents from 
inheriting.  By using consistent, inclusive language, the statute 
can be uniformly applied in all PCC cases, regardless of marital 
status or sex of the parent. 
196. Id. at 424. 
197. Id. at 422. 
198. Id. at 424. 
199. Id. at 427. 
200. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221 (2015).
201. See Presentation on HB 1904, supra note 9. 
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D. Proposal to Amend Section 28-9-221
In response to the problems with Arkansas’s PCC statute 
outlined above, I propose amending the statute to clarify the legal 
status and inheritance rights of PCC in the state.  To resolve the 
foregoing issues, I propose the following language: 
Child Conceived After the Death of a Parent 
A child of the decedent conceived and born after the death 
of the decedent shall be deemed a child of the decedent if: 
(a) either:
(1) the individual consented in a record to the use of his or
her genetic material to posthumously conceive a child by assisted 
reproduction; or 
(2) the individual’s intent to conceive a child by assisted
reproduction after the individual’s death is established by clear 
and convincing evidence; and 
(b) the embryo is in utero no later than thirty-six (36) months
after the individual’s death. 
(c) The person designated by the decedent to control the
decedent’s genetic material should give written notice within six 
(6) months of the decedent’s death to the person with the power
to control the distribution of either the decedent’s property or
death benefits payable upon the decedent’s death of the
possibility of using decedent’s genetic material for posthumous
conception.  The failure to provide timely notice relieves any
fiduciary or other person in control of the decedent’s property or
death benefits of liability for distributing the decedent’s property
or benefits to the proper beneficiaries at the end of the six (6)
month notice period.  In the event that notice of intent to use the
decedent’s genetic material for posthumous conception is given
after six (6) months, the fiduciary of the decedent’s estate has the
duty to retain any remaining assets of the estate to which the
potential child may have valid claim until the end of the three (3)
year time period for posthumous conception.
(d) Unless of an agreement to the contrary, the decedent’s
consent to posthumous conception with a spouse is automatically 
revoked upon the divorce of the parties. 
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This proposed statutory language serves to resolve the issues 
in the current statute by providing lucidity and increasing 
flexibility.  First, the consent requirement is simplified and allows 
PCC to inherit even in the absence of a formal signed writing. 
Second, the time limitation of three years provides clarity and 
additional time for a surviving parent to grieve and consider 
posthumous reproduction.  Third, the proposed statute includes a 
notice requirement to protect the child’s interests in the deceased 
parent’s estate and allow for timely estate administration.  Fourth, 
the suggested language makes it clear that the statute applies to 
all PCC regardless of the parent’s marital status or sex.  Lastly, 
this proposed statute is mindful of the best interests of the child. 
By relaxing the restrictive consent requirement and time 
limitations, it provides greater opportunity for PCC to inherit 
despite their parents’ nontraditional reproductive choices. 
CONCLUSION 
The advancements in medical technology have altered the 
traditional timelines of human reproduction.  Although many 
states have failed to update existing intestacy laws to provide 
inheritance rights to PCC, Arkansas allows these children to 
become rightful heirs.  However, the Arkansas statute governing 
PCC presents a number of issues that the legislature must address. 
First, the consent provision presents practical and legal 
difficulties because of its ambiguous language and ostensible 
requirement to seek out medical professionals in order to provide 
legal consent.  Second, the plain language of the statute itself is 
conflicting, and the time limitation is overly restrictive to the 
surviving parent.  Third, the statute lacks any stipulation to give 
notice to the fiduciary of the decedent’s estate of the possibility 
of posthumous conception.  Finally, the language of the statute 
appears to apply only to married parents. 
To resolve these deficiencies, the Arkansas Legislature 
should amend the current statute in a number of ways.  First, the 
consent requirement should be revised to require the decedent to 
provide consent in a record or allow consent to be establish by 
clear and convincing evidence, with divorce automatically 
revoking prior consent to posthumously conceive.  Second, the 
conflicting language of the statute that allows a posthumously 
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conceived child to fulfill part of the time limitation and yet fail to 
meet the time requirement for birth must be resolved.  This should 
be accomplished by extending the time limitation to conceive to 
within three years of the deceased parent’s death.  Third, a 
surviving parent of the posthumously conceived child should be 
required to provide notice within six months to a fiduciary or 
custodian managing the decedent’s assets that posthumous 
conception is a possibility.  However, this procedural element 
should not serve to bar a child from inheriting if the surviving 
parent fails to give notice to the fiduciary of the decedent’s estate. 
Finally, the statutory language should omit the term “spouse” to 
allow it to apply equally to PCC born to married and unmarried 
parents.  These changes will allow for the timely administration 
of estates while providing clarity for PCC’s inheritance rights and 
flexibility for those who wish to posthumously conceive a child 
in Arkansas. 
